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Abstract 
 
In this thesis we decompose the close-to-close return into overnight and intraday returns for the 
15 most traded stocks on Oslo Stock Exchange over the period of 2003 to 2014. By analyzing the 
stocks individually and in an equally weighted portfolio we find the return of non-trading hours 
consistently higher than the trading hours. This holds across all weekdays, monthly and yearly 
measures as well the sub-periods of 2003 to 2008 and 2009 to 2014. We find the overnight and 
intraday having a negative relationship, where the returns tend to move in opposite directions. 
From the first to the second sub-period we discover large difference in the amount of overnight 
and intraday return. We argue possible causes being: the presence of semiprofessional day 
traders; illiquidity premium; change in the risk-reward. The true return of the weekend, the 
overnight on Monday, is found positive while an exceeding amount of intraday is the one 
contributing to the overall negative weekend return. This adds new view to previous studies on 
the Weekend Effect (French, 1980).  
 
JEL classification codes: G10, G12, G14  
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1. Introduction 
 
In today’s financial markets there is continuous flow of information. Since the development of 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH, Fama, 1965a) it was widely accepted that the price of a 
security should reflect all information. As a result, a change in the price of a security would only 
be caused by new information. A security would have the ability to efficiently grasp news, and it 
would be incorporated without delay in its price. According to the EMH, a stock cannot be 
considered to be over- neither undervalued nor can an investor hope to achieve greater return than 
that of a portfolio, consisting of individual stocks by doing technical or fundamental analyses. 
 
Over the last decades, there have been numerous documentations of so called “anomalies” that 
are inconsistent with the EMH. These anomalies are patterns of returns, which seem to contradict 
that of an efficient market. Take for example the documented anomalies of: The January Effect, 
finding an abnormal behavior, where stock prices tend to substantial increase, during the month 
of January; The Weekend Effect, documenting a pattern, where returns tend to be strong on 
Friday and weak on the following Monday implying a negative, at best zero weekend return; The 
Day of the Week Effect, finding stock returns to continuously increase as the week progresses; 
The Holiday Effect, finding stocks to perform better close to holiday dates
1
. These anomalies 
document irregular returns contradicting the EMH.    
 
Recently, there has been empirical evidence towards an anomaly related to the relationship 
between a stocks return during trading and non-trading hours. During market closure, price 
changes are not continuous. As a result, new information is not incorporated in the stock price. 
The information related to prior day closure is not equivalent to the information at opening hours. 
This has implications for dynamics of the stock price. Normally, a stocks daily return is estimated 
using the difference between the current and previous closing price. Improved availability of 
transaction data makes it possible to decompose the close-to-close return into two sub-periods; 
night (close-to-open) return and day (open-to-close) return. Empirical studies found stock returns 
to be higher at night than during day. These findings are important as they document returns only 
                                                          
1
 E.g. Thaler, Richard H. (1987) for January Effect, French (1980) for the Weekend Effect, Dubious & Louvet 
(1986) for the Day of the Week Effect and Cadsby & Ratner (1992) for the Holiday Effect.  
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being achievable during night, when there is no ongoing trade, rather than day.  
 
The goal of this thesis is to study the returns of night and the day on the Norwegian stock 
exchange. We investigate the 15 most traded stocks over the period of 2003 to 2014. As far as we 
know, there has been done no similar research on the Oslo Stock Exchange on the anomaly. In 
the rest of the thesis we address the night (close-to-open) return as overnight and the day (open-
to-close) return as intraday. Returns referred to are daily averages. Returns of individual 
weekdays, months and years are summarized daily averages, divided by the amount of trading 
days of the respective weekday, month or year.   
 
We examine stocks both individually and in a constructed equally weighted portfolio. Our results 
reveal high overnight return and weak intraday return. This holds for any day of the week, as well 
as for most of months and years of the 12-year period. Among the investigated stocks, we find 
two extreme opposites. These deliver a remarkable amount of return. One delivers a high amount 
of overnight return, the other a high amount of intraday return. Strangely, the one with high 
overnight has negative intraday and the one with high intraday has negative overnight. This 
phenomenon is not only found for the two individual stocks, but across our sample. It may seem 
as the overnight return always is the reverse of the intraday return.  
 
The difference between overnight and intraday led us towards performing a correlation and a 
regression. The correlation is used to investigate whether the overnight and subsequent intraday 
exhibit a relationship or not. The high overnight return and weak intraday return could indicate 
that they vary negatively. We also use lagged values of intraday and overnight to see if there is a 
relationship with preceding returns.  Our results reveal that majority of the stocks holds a 
negative correlation between overnight and intraday, but at a low degree. This has consequences 
as the Theory of Random Walk (e.g. Fama, 1965b) predicts historical prices, not to hold any form 
for consistent relationship. Our results prove that overnight and intraday tend to vary in opposite 
directions. although the relationship is weak. Using lagged values gives a result more consistent 
with the Theory of Random Walk, as the results are highly mixed. It gives no clear picture. On 
the other hand, one would not expect the overnight and intraday to exhibit such a behavior.  
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Since there exists a correlation between the overnight and intraday, we investigate if the 
overnight return is able to predict the intraday return using a regression analysis. We use the 
intraday return as the dependent variable. The independent variable consists of the overnight, but 
also the lagged returns of intraday and overnight. The coefficient for the overnight return for 
majority of the samples is found to be negative. This implies that a minor increase in the 
overnight return would lead to an expected decrease in the following intraday return. The 
movements of the overnight affects the intraday. Our result is found to be contradicting to the 
Weak-Form of the EMH, as historical prices are not supposed to be beneficial to predict future 
returns.  On the other hand, the explanatory power of our model is moderate. We find the 
overnight return to explain a small part of the variation of the intraday. Despite this, our results 
are not supposed to find a relationship between night and day, according to the EMH and the 
Theory of Random Walk.  
 
We perform robustness tests, by dividing the equally weighted portfolio into two consecutive 
periods extending from 2003 to 2008 and 2009 to 2014. Between the two periods we find a large 
difference in the amount of overnight and intraday return. From the first to the second sub-period 
the return of overnight is found to increase more than two times. Returns of intraday are found to 
decrease more than three times. We find the positive close-to-close return over the period of 2009 
to 2014 to solely be due to the non-trading hours. Trading hours are found to deliver zero, mostly 
negative returns. An interesting finding is that the standard deviation of the overnight decrease in 
the latter period, while the standard deviation of the intraday is unchanged. This implies that the 
increased amount of positive and negative return in the second period is not a result of increased 
fluctuation. In other words, a decreased standard deviation means the overnight return fluctuates 
less around its mean. This is contrary to what we would expect seeing the amount of overnight 
and intraday changing so much. We argue a possible explanation behind the increase of the 
overnight return in the second period being due to three reasons: the presence of semiprofessional 
day traders; illiquidity premium; change in the risk-reward. Consequently, we suggest the 
intraday return correcting the high overnight and thus, being negative. 
 
Our results have implications for the validity of the EMH, but also add new views to the above-
mentioned anomalies. The Weekend Effect, Day of the Week Effect and Holiday Effect all have 
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returns estimated using the close-to-close. When we decompose the close-to-close return we find 
among others a positive return over the weekend, which is the reversed previously documented 
on the Weekend Effect. We find the overnight of Friday close to Monday open to be highly 
positive. Our results indicate that the negative weekend is only due to weak returns during 
Mondays trading hours. The true weekend return is positive. Similarly, in the case of the Day of 
the Week Effect, we find the behavior, where returns increase as the week progresses only to be 
because of the overnight. Intraday returns does not show a similar strong pattern to increase as 
the week progress. Adding to the Holiday Effect, we find the overnight return to be weak during 
months consisting of many non-trading days (e.g. May & December). In the same months, the 
intraday is found to be strong. We argue a possible explanation being a shift in the behavior of 
investors holding stocks longer and being reluctant to sell.  
 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2 we present existing literature related to 
the problem at hand. We introduce theoretical papers that to some extend led to the study of the 
overnight and intraday, both those who argue for and against its existence. Following, we present 
the main studies contributing to the empirical literature on the overnight and intraday return. We 
also distinguish between the theoretical and empirical hypothesizes on the explanation behind the 
anomaly. Chapter 3 presents the data, assumptions and techniques used in this paper, as well as 
the process of extracting raw material, decomposing into returns and adjusting data for dividend 
and splits. A descriptive statistic is also presented to give an overview over our main results. In 
chapter 4, we present the results of calculations and robustness tests. In chapter 5, our findings 
are discussed in the light of existing theoretical and empirical literature, and we add possible 
explanations to the behavior of night and day. Included is a brief subchapter regarding the 
challenges of implementing the overnight as an investment strategy. We present a conclusion in 
chapter 6, summarizing our main findings.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
The origin of financial anomalies is the pattern of return, which shows inconsistency with what is 
defined as an efficient market. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is a concept developed 
by Eugene Fama (1965a). The theory, both highly controversial and disputed, states that it is 
impossible to beat the market. Consequently, under the light of the theory, modern financial 
methods of using fundamental or technical analyses to search for undervalued stocks or 
predicting trends are rendered useless.  
 
A market could be considered to have three different forms of efficiency (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 
2011, 375-376):  
 Weak-form, stating that examining historical prices, trading volume or short interest 
would not be beneficial to predict future returns.    
  Semi-strong-form, all available information to the public is reflected in the stock 
price. Information also including past prices.  
  Strong-form, stock prices reflect all relevant information, even the information only 
available for inside workers.   
 
Supporting the EMH is the theory of Random Walk (Fama, 1965b), which states stock prices 
series is independent from each other, and while following a similar distribution, their past 
movements or trends cannot be used to predict that of future movements.  
 
Among others
2
, a counterpoint to the discussion around the validity of an efficient market is the 
growing study of the overnight and the intraday return. Empirical results have been found 
inconsistent with the weak-form of the efficient market. Historical prices have beneficial relations 
to predict future returns. The returns of overnight and intraday have a behavior indicating a non-
random walk. In other words, the returns of night and day are found to be dependent on each 
other. The study of the anomaly is a result of previous theoretical and empirical work. Papers 
                                                          
2
 Take for example the above-mentioned anomalies of the Weekend Effect, the Day of the Week Effect and the 
Holiday Effect  
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studying the volatility and return around market closure are relevant. We present the main 
relevant papers for our study here. 
 
McInish, Ord and Wood (1985) were among the first to investigate patterns around non-trading 
hours.  Using high frequency (intra minute tick) data to analyze the behavior of returns and the 
characteristics of trades, they report the return and standard deviation to be unusually high during 
the beginning and the ending of a trading day. Omitting the beginning and the end-of-day 
movements from the sample revealed a strong reduction in the autocorrelation of the time series. 
This suggested that there exists a relation in the movement of a stock right after and before non-
trading hours. Harris (1989) extended the investigation of the abnormal return occurring at 
trading end and cites the following: “A large mean price change is observed on the last daily 
NYSE transaction. […] The results indicate that the phenomenon is pervasive over most firms 
and days.” (Harris, 1989, p.29) The event of strong movements in a stock’s price around closure 
and opening is found to be persistent and not just limited to an individual period, firm or industry. 
 
French and Roll (1986) reports stock returns to be more volatile during normal trading hours than 
the non-trading hours of the weekend. A phenomenon they categorize as strange as they cite: 
“Asset returns display a puzzling difference in volatility between exchange trading hours and 
non-trading hours.” (French & Roll, 1986, p.23) They report the open-to-close variance of return 
from an average trading day to be six times higher than the variance of close-to-open return over 
a weekend. Despite the fact that the weekend lasts eleven times longer. In other words, the 
volatility of return is much stronger during opening hours, than during non-trading period of a 
weekend. They argued the reason for higher volatility during the week, being due to the 
difference in information flow between trading and non-trading hours.  
 
The standard way to measure price volatility is to look at the returns upon close-to-close. Stoll 
and Whaley (1990) attempted to measure volatility better and created a framework to look at the 
returns of open-to-open. They found the volatility of open-to-open to be higher than close-to-
close. Evidence presented the correlation between daytime and following overnight, exceeding 
the correlation between the overnight and the following daytime return. For the result of the 24-
hour analysis they quote: “[…] the overnight return tends to be reversed by the following daytime 
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return […] On the other hand, the daytime return is much less likely to be reversed by the return 
in the following night.” (Stoll & Whaley, 1990, p.54) They argued that this would imply a 
temporary price deviation at the market opening. The closing price was less likely to reflect a 
temporary deviation.   
 
Hong and Wang (2000) found similarities with previous empirical findings when they studied 
how market closures affect investor’s trading policies and the resulting return-generating process. 
Several of these findings are related to the overnight and intraday return. Firstly, there exists a U-
shaped pattern for the mean and volatility of returns over trading periods. Secondly, the market 
activity around closure and opening are higher. Thirdly, the returns over trading periods are more 
volatile than non-trading periods. Fourthly, open-to-open returns are more volatile than close-to-
close returns.  Lastly, higher returns over trading periods than over non-trading periods. On the 
other hand, Longstaff (1995) developed a theoretical model predicting high returns over non-
trading hours. He argued the illiquidity investors would face by holding a stock overnight would 
be rewarded with a premium and therefore, the overnight return would hold a positive return.  
 
There are disputes of the role returns during night has for the overall return. There are especially 
four empirical studies documenting the impact and importance the return of overnight and 
intraday has had, which are relevant for our study. 
 
One of the first studies empirically documenting the overnight return continuously outperforming 
the intraday return is the paper of Cliff, Cooper and Gulen (2008). They find strong 
documentation on the excess return of the S&P 500 during 1993 to 2006 being solely due to 
overnight returns. The return of the intraday over the decade is consistently close to zero, 
sometimes negative. Securities listed on NASDAQ and the NYSE AMEX Inter@ctive Week 
Internet Index also are documented to have strong returns during market closure. Detailed tick 
data made it possible to decompose the intraday into various return intervals spread out over the 
trading day. The main driver behind the negative return was found to be due to the “AM-hour” 
(8:30 to 9:30), the opening hours. A reason they argue being due to high opening prices, 
subsequently declining in the first hour of trading. As the day would progress, the various time 
intervals of returns would gradually improve and daily performance of a stock would be highest 
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close to trading stop. The overnight exceeding the intraday was found persistent across individual 
weekdays, as well as most of months and years. Not only limited to returns of indexes, the high 
overnight return was found to hold for other securities including ETF’s and E-Mini Futures. 
  
Clark and Kelly (2011) compared the intraday and overnight returns of various U.S ETF’s. Using 
the returns to estimate Sharpe ratio (SR), they found the overnight SR to constantly exceed the 
intraday SR. This implies the premium one receives by taking on risk, is higher at night than day.  
Following, they found the overnight to be positive when the intraday was negative. A possible 
argument behind the overnight occurrence was due to the influence of day traders. According to 
Clark and Kelly (2011), a semiprofessional day trader who normally performs more than 25 
trades a day would account for a large amount of the trades done on NYSE and NASDAQ. These 
day traders settling and opening their positions would cause a liquidation effect. Not wanting to 
hold stocks over a non-trading period, unable to settle their position, would push the day traders 
to buy at morning and sell at night. Prices increase by the buy and decrease by the sell pattern of 
the day traders, as a result this would cause positive overnight returns.   
 
The paper of Cai and Qiu (2013) studied the presence of overnight and intraday return across 31 
international stock markets. They find the anomaly to exist in 20 countries, both developed and 
emerging markets. The strongest overnight is documented on exchanges allowing short selling. 
As they  cite: “Our findings suggest that investors are generally better off buying at close but 
selling at opening, especially so on those markets that have high level of information asymmetry 
and short selling is not commonly practiced.” (Cai & Qiu, 2013, p.1) This implies that an 
investor would be best entering a long position overnight and a short position during intraday. 
Then, they find the overnight return to be less volatile than intraday return volatility, as they 
conclude that the superior overnight is not to be justified by a risk-return trade off. In other 
words, a low volatility overnight implies that investors are not compensated with a high return by 
taking on greater risk during non-trading hours.  
 
The paper of Branch and Ma (2012) studied the relationship between the overnight and the 
subsequent intraday. Over the period of 1994 to 1999 and 2000 to 2005, a negative correlation 
between the return of overnight and subsequent intraday is found on NYSE, AMEX and 
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NASDAQ. A negative correlation signifies the return of overnight and subsequent intraday to 
vary in opposite directions. A further analysis reveals the relation to hold with the previous day 
(lagged) intraday and overnight returns. The overnight return is found positively correlated with 
the lagged overnight and negatively correlated with the lagged intraday. By dividing the markets 
into market size categories, they find the correlation to be strongest among low cap stocks. 
Hoping to find this discovery usable to predict future returns, it led them towards a regression 
analysis. The regression was performed by regressing the intraday on the independent variables 
of overnight and the lagged variables of overnight and intraday. The result from the regression 
revealed that the overnight could predict the subsequent intraday movement. This also held for 
the lagged variables. The movement in the overnight and lagged overnight would predict the 
subsequent intraday to move in the opposite direction. The lagged intraday would predict the 
subsequent intraday to move in the same direction. This had consequences for the weak-form of 
the EMH and the Theory of Random Walk. Three potential explanations to the behavior of the 
overnight and the intraday return are presented in the paper:  
 Firstly, the market-makers behavior when opening their assigned stocks. A situation 
where market-makers would push the price of a stock up during auction hours, resulting 
in a positive overnight. 
 Secondly, the bid-ask bounce. A stock closing at bid following a non-trading period and 
then, opening at ask would result in a positive overnight, even though the stock had not 
moved over the non-trading period.  
 Thirdly, the specialist behavior. Specialists, who put their own fund at risk, are 
particularly inclined to allow their assigned stocks to open away from the prior close.  
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3. Data 
 
In this thesis we collect data over the period of 2003 to 2014. A consecutive 12-year period gives 
us the opportunity to observe the movements of night and day over a long period of time, but also 
under different market conditions. The last decade has faced rapid declines, serious turmoil and 
upswings. Following the years of 2003, the Oslo Bors Benchmark Index increased. In 2008, it 
faced a rapid decline caused by the financial crisis
3
. From 2009 to 2014 the Benchmark Index 
continuously increased and noted numerous all-time highs, with minor corrections.   
 
We analyze the return of overnight and intraday by two methods. Firstly, we briefly analyze the 
effect of overnight and intraday on individual stocks. Secondly, we construct an equally weighted 
portfolio
4
. The purpose behind using an equally weighted portfolio is to study if a common trend 
in the individual stocks can be found. We also have divided the returns of the equally weighted 
portfolio into weekly, monthly and yearly values. This is to further analyze which day, month or 
year contributing to the overall return and to compare our result to other anomalies. The equally 
weighted portfolio is also divided in to two sub-periods. The first period is from 2003 to 2008 
and the second period is from 2009 to 2014. By dividing into sub-periods, we are more closely 
able to investigate the overnight and the intraday in different market states. We define the first 
period as a combined bull and bear market. The second period is a pure bull market
5
. 
 
Previous studies on the night and day anomaly include majority of the stocks listed on the 
represented exchanges in their analysis. We chose to limit the amount of stocks, by having them 
fulfill two preconditions. 
 
Firstly, we alone want to include stocks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange for the longest period 
possible. By doing so, we obtain a dataset excluding stocks potentially including traces of listing 
effects. It has been documented (e.g. Kadlec & McConnell, June, 1994) an abnormal behavior in 
the returns of stocks recently listed. Stocks have been found to perform substantially stronger 
                                                          
3
 We define the year of 2008 as the main period of the financial crisis 
4
 An equally weighted portfolio means a portfolio where each individual stock contribute alike  
5
 We define a bull market to be a period with a clear increasing trend in the Oslo Bors stock index, with only minor 
corrections. We define a bear market to be a period with a clear decreasing trend.  
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shortly after the listing. We also want to exclude stocks that have been delisted to prevent 
abnormal behavior in the return due to removal. The benefits with operating with surviving 
stocks are the opportunity to observe a return pattern over a continuous time. It also reveals 
where the overnight performs better than the intraday and vice versa. We chose the time period 
from 2003 to 2014, mainly because this gave us the best tradeoff between length and amount of 
liquid stocks.  
 
Secondly, we only want to include stocks that are considered highly liquid. To examine the 
liquidity, we inspect the stocks respective turnover. High turnover typically implies the stock 
being traded continuously and on a daily basis. The reasoning behind this action is to prevent 
having the problem with stagnant stocks where there are no trades on the stock over a long period 
of time. The return of a stagnant stock is usually estimated by using the closing bid and ask or the 
average of the two. Previous research documents that the return computed on the bid and ask are 
false, mainly because it does not reflect the true return (e.g. Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). In our 
case, it is essential to capture the true stock return. A high liquidity is therefore needed. Oslo 
Stock Exchange is a relatively small financial market and the amount of continuously traded 
stocks are limited. To determine the stocks to be included, we receive an overview of the 15 most 
traded stocks, measured by turnover from 2003 to 2014 by DnB Markets
6
. See Table 1. Where 
the stocks, that fit our requirement are presented with their sectors and turnover. We end up with 
a total of 15 stocks.  
 
The stock prices are collected from 2 databases. The first period from 2003 to 2008 is collected 
from Netfonds database
7
 . The second period from 2009 to 2014 is received from the database of 
DnB Markets
8
. We combine the two sets of raw data to create the whole 12-year period. From the 
raw data we extract two stock prices; the opening and the closing price. From both databases the 
open value represents the price of the first possible trade after the end of the starting auction and 
the close represents the price of the last trade
9
. 
                                                          
6
 Finsrud F., DNB Markets, personal communication, April 28, 2015 
7
 http://www.netfonds.no/quotes/market.php - Each individual stock has to be searched for 
8
 Finsrud F., DNB Markets, personal communication, February 3, 2015 – Received raw data and the definition of 
open and close 
9
 Ingebritsen L., Netfonds, personal communication, February 20, 2015 – The definition of open and close. 
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Table 1: Sampled stocks with respective sector and turnover 
Company name Ticker GICS
10
 Turnover  
Det Norske Oljeselskap DNO Energy 320 486 567  
Fred. Olsen Energy FOE Energy 123 541 913 
Frontline FRO Energy 334 772 845 
Marine Harvest MHG Consumer Staples 380 061 024 
Norsk Hydro NHY Materials 1 730 478 333 
Orkla ORK Consumer Staples 556 687 849 
Petroleum Geo-Service PGS Energy 517 626 247 
Prosafe PRS Energy 162 884 702 
Royal Caribbean Cruises RCL Consumer Discretionary 291 025 195 
Schibsted SCH Consumer Discretionary 139 222 679 
Storebrand STB Financial 290 383 598 
Statoil STL Energy 3 671 125 700 
Subsea 7 SUBC Energy 453 958 125 
Telenor TEL Telecom 1 214 457 292 
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company TGS Energy 236 614 289 
Turnover is computed as tick by tick stock price multiplied with volume, given in NOK thousands.  
 
We obtain the amount of active trading days over the 12-year period from Oslo Stock Exchange, 
a total of 3015 days
11
. For the sub-periods, this equals 1509 active trading days from 2003 to 
2008 and 1506 active trading days from 2009 to 2014.  Some stocks in our sample have more 
than 3015 trading days. These additional active trading days have their open and close values 
equal to the previous day value. As a result, the returns of the respective additional days are zero. 
These excess observations are deleted and have no impact on the overall return. Other stocks may 
have shorter observations because of trading pauses. For our analysis we want each stock to have 
equal amount of active trading days. To achieve this, we manually adjust all trading days from 
                                                          
10
 https://www.msci.com/gics 
11
 Oslo Bors Information Service, personal communication, January 1 and February 25, 2015.   
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the sample to fit the number of active trading days received from Oslo Stock Exchange. As a 
benchmark on which dates of the 3015 active trading days, we use Statoil (STL). STL is the stock 
with highest turnover on the exchange and also exhibits exactly 3015 trading days. For stocks 
that have fewer trading days, we set the open and the close of the missing date equal to the 
previous trading day close value. This nullifies the specific trading day’s overnight, intraday and 
daily return, but still includes the trading day in our analyses. This procedure affects both the 
means and the standard deviations, but not to an extent we find it significant for our results.   
3.1 Adjusting for Splits and Dividend Payments.  
 
To generate data that only consider the return during overnight and intraday, our sample needs to 
be adjusted for dividend and stock splits.
 
Since our primary data is not pre-adjusted, it has to be 
done manually. As a stock tends to drop by the same amount it pays in dividend. A stock split 
would decrease or increase the value of a stock by the split ratio. By doing the adjustments, we 
remove potential gaps in the return that otherwise could indicate irregular patterns. The result is a 
smooth return over the 12-year period. We assume the dividend to be distributed as cash dividend 
and reinvested in the stock. Additionally, when adjusted we assume the dividend to be paid to the 
investor holding the stock overnight, and not to the investor that is holding the stock intraday.   
 
Information related to the amount of dividend, distribution dates and stock splits are collected 
from the Newsweb
12
 of Oslo Stock Exchange. Issues with dividend amounts being given in a 
foreign currency is solved by using the Norwegian Central Banks daily exchange rates
13
 at the 
ex-dividend day and then, converting the amount to Norwegian Kroner. 
 
The method for adjusting for dividend and split is the following. For the individual stock, the 
most recent dividend payment serves as an anchor date. All previous close and open values are 
adjusted by a dividend multiplier calculated with the values the day before ex. dividend date, 
                                                          
12
 http://www.newsweb.no/newsweb/search.do 
13
 http://www.norges-bank.no/statistikk/valutakurser/ 
Amundsen & Bryhn 
14 
 
adhering to Center for Research in Security Prices standards
14
. The multiplier is calculated as 
follows:  
 
           
        
    
                                                         (3.1) 
 
                 (
   
    
)                                                                (3.2)  
Where: P is price, DD is dividend and t is time.  
 
Where Pt-1 equals the close (or open) value at time t-1, DDt is the amount of dividend distributed 
at the t
th
 date, t is the ex-dividend date. If the stock has distributed numerous dividends over the 
time period a set of multipliers are calculated using the same method for each ex-dividend date. 
Every multiplier will be used to adjust the closing and opening values prior to the respective 
distribution date, when the multiplier is calculated. An important thing to notice is in case the 
stock has undergone a split. A split divides the amount of historical dividend distributed, all prior 
dividend amounts need to be adjusted. This is done by multiplying the dividend by the split ratio. 
 
To illustrate the computation, assume a closing price of 210 on January 9
th
 and that the ex-date 
equals January 10
th
. The firm has informed of a 5 NOK cash dividend to be distributed. In this 
situation we would calculate the dividend multiplier as (1-[5/210]) = 0.9762. All prior closing 
values are modified by multiplying using the multiplier. The investor holding the stock at the 
overnight period will receive the dividend. The investor holding the stock at the intraday will not. 
The adjustment makes the price before the dividend distribution aligned with the all previous 
prices, so that no irregular movements exist as a consequence of dividend payments. If the stock 
announces another dividend payment a month earlier and the multiplier for that specific date is 
calculated to be 0.98 then all the prior days closing values are adjusted by multiplying 0.9762 * 
0.98 = 0.9567. 
 
 
                                                          
14
 http://www.crsp.com/products/documentation/crsp-calculations 
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3.2 Computation of Daily, Overnight and Intraday Returns 
 
Figure 1: Visual presentations of the decomposition of daily close-to-close return 
Closet-1  Opent  Closet 
     
     
     
 Overnight  Intraday  
     
     
 Close-to-Close  
 
The goal is to decompose the close-to-close return into a day and a night return as illustrated in 
Figure 1. Overnight return, defined as the difference between previous close and current open; 
intraday return, defined as the difference between current open and current close; daily close-to-
close return, defined as the difference between current and previous close. Returns are computed 
as log returns. By using the method of log, we gain the advantage of decomposing daily total 
return into day and night return and comparing the returns across assets more easily, than that of 
simple returns. The time-additive (Campbell et al, 1997) property of the log return means that we 
do not lose any information during the decomposition; it also allows us to write the strings of 
return as:  
 
∑   
 
                         (3.3) 
 
Continuing, the close-to-close return is written as a relationship between the two different 
continuously compounded returns as: 
 
                                                                 (3.4) 
 
In order to do the decomposition, we need to calculate the returns as natural log return. We use 
the following formula to compute the returns: 
  
                      
      
          
 )        (3.5) 
 
                     
       
       
 )         (3.6) 
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 )       (3.7) 
 
 
If we were to compare our returns to other papers that use simple return, there will be a 
difference. The use of log return means that our means will be lower than if we would use simple 
return, and this amount is equal to the amount related to the variance of the returns. (Hudson, 
Gregoriou 2010).  This means that high variance return will differ even more. Implying that there 
is no one-to-one relationship between return calculated using log return and simple return. The 
difference could lead to a variation in the statistical test, as well. T-tests on simple return can 
produce higher significance level than log returns if means are positive. And may produce lower 
significance level if mean is negative.  
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
After following these procedures we end up with a sample consisting of 3015 trading days 
between 2003 and 2014. All these have adjusted open and close prices. These are used to 
compute 3014 days with return of close-to-close, which get decomposed using log return into a 
same amount of overnight and intraday returns per stock. When constructing an equally weighted 
portfolio we end up same amount of return as for one stock. The portfolio is divided into 2 sub-
periods, where the first period holds 1508 days with returns and second holds 1506 days with 
returns. Each sub-period has its own close-to-close, overnight and intraday return.  
 
In Table 2, we have a descriptive statistic of our main results from the equally weighted portfolio, 
included is the sub-periods. This data is used frequently in our thesis. We do not present 
summary on individual stocks.  
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 2003 to 2014 
 Overnight Intraday Close-to-close 
Days with return 3014 3014 3014 
Mean 10.3 -5.4 4.9 
Standard deviation 1.0 1.5 1.8 
Min -753.6 -1011.4 -1170.5 
Max 753.6 988.7 1110.2 
Skewness -0.1 -0.6 -0.4 
Kurtosis 9 5 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Key figures from the equally weighted portfolio over the whole period and the two sub-periods. Mean, min and max 
are given in basis points. Standard deviation is given in per-cent. Skewness and kurtosis is given in real numbers. 
Returns are given as arithmetic returns.    
 
  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the equally weighted portfolio 
 2003 to 2008 2009 to 2014 
 Overnight Intraday Close-to-close Overnight Intraday Close-to-close 
Days with return 1506 1506 1506 1508 1508 1508 
Mean 7.1 -2.3 4.7 13.7 -8.9 4.8 
Standard deviation 1.2 1.5 1.9 0.8 1.5 1.7 
Min -753.6 -1011.3 -1170.5 -586.3 -793.4 -780.3 
Max 753.6 988.7 1110.2 483.9 727.0 824.1 
Skewness -0.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 
Kurtosis 8 8 6 6 3 3 
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4. Empirical Results of the Night and Day Return 
 
The empirical result is divided into four parts. The first part discloses the main findings from 
studying the stocks night and day returns, in an equally weighted portfolio. We present the 
averages and the variance of the returns. The second part covers our analysis of the stocks 
individually. We also present two unique stocks delivering abnormal returns, relative to the rest 
of the sample. The third part conveys our result of a correlation and a regression, analyzing the 
night and day relationship. The fourth part contains the robustness test, where we analyze the 
night and day return of the equally weighted portfolios by weekdays, months, years and two sub-
periods.  
 
The result of analyzing the night and day in an equally weighted portfolio is positive overnight 
and negative intraday return.  
 
Table 3: Return and standard deviation from 2003 to 2014 
 Close-to-close Overnight Intraday  
Mean 4.9 10.3 -5.4  
Standard deviation 1.8 1.0 1.5  
Mean is given as basis points and standard deviation is given in per-cent. Returns are given as arithmetic returns. 
 
In Table 3, we present our findings studying the night and day returns over the period of 2003 to 
2014. Considering the returns being averages of 3015 trading days, it suggests a strong 
performance of the overnight and a weak performance of the intraday. The intraday holds a return 
of negative 5.4 basis points. Entering a position at the opening price and settling the position at 
the closing price would on average end with a negative return. On the contrary, the overnight 
holds a return of 10.3 basis points, a remarkably stronger performance than the intraday. The 
daily spread between the overnight and intraday of 15.7 basis points. The return of non-trading 
hours is by far exceeding the trading hours. Interestingly, we observe the standard deviation of 
the overnight to be less than the standard deviation of the intraday. More specifically, the return 
of intraday tends to vary more around its mean, than the overnight. The intraday faces higher 
fluctuation than the overnight either in the form of negative or positive return. 
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Table 4: Amount of days with negative return from 2003 to 2014 
Period Days with negative return Total % 
Overnight 1224 3014 40.61 
Intraday 1488 3014 49.37 
Per-cent is given as amount of negative days divided by total days. 
 
In Table 4, we compute the amount of trading days ending with a negative return as a percentage 
of the total 3014 calculated returns, both for night and day. We question if the large difference we 
find between the overnight and intraday could be explainable by a persistently negative day 
result. For the overnight we find 40.6 % of the observations to be negative
15
. A result indicating 
an average week having 2 out of 5 trading days resulting in a negative overnight return. For the 
intraday we find 49.4 % of the days ending with a negative performance. Despite majority of the 
observed intraday holding a positive return at days close, the average return is still negative. This 
tells us that the sum of all intraday returns of the portfolio is more negative than positive. More 
specifically, the amount of negative returns exceeds the amount of positive returns, even though 
the majority of trading days ends with a positive return. However, out of the observed overnight 
returns 59.4 % days are positive. In this way, we find neither of the returns to be constantly 
negative. The large difference between night and day cannot be explained by a constant 
performance. The returns vary between being positive and negative. This leads us to believe we 
could expect some periods of the 12-years performing differently than others. We are left with an 
important question: Is it normal with a constant change between positive and negative returns of 
intraday and overnight. More specifically, do some periods hold a larger amount days ending 
with negative overnight or intraday return than others. 
 
To illustrate the difference we observe between the overnight and the intraday we graphically 
plot the growth of $100 invested in the return one could achieve investing daily in either the night 
or day period
16
. We add the close-to-close return for comparison. There is one equation for each 
of the three compared returns. The cumulative wealth for overnight is calculated as follows:  
                                                          
15
 The measure of negative returns does not include days ending with zero return. Positive returns include days 
ending with zero returns.  
16
 By night period we mean to buy at the previous days close and sell at open. By the day period we mean to buy at 
the open and sell at the close.  
Amundsen & Bryhn 
20 
 
 
                               )                 )                  )  (4.1) 
 Where: n = 3014, P0 = Initial investment and Overnight t = First overnight return in our sample.  
 
An important notice is that the graph does not consider transaction costs, but only looks at the 
growth by the returns.   
Figure 2: Cumulative wealth from 2003 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial invest amount $100. CTC equals the investment in the close-to-close. 
 
The visual perspective of the graph holds three main points. Firstly, the overnight investment has 
a positive growth over the 12-year period. We observe a limited amount of negative spikes in the 
overnight curve, as the return is continuously strong. We find no periods, which could indicate a 
larger amount of negative overnight return. In 2008 the intraday changes from positive returns in 
the previous years to negative returns and where the investment value falls towards zero. 
Secondly, the close-to-close investment is only positive because of the strong overnight. The 
intraday contributes little to the overall return of the investment. Thirdly, we observe a change in 
the amount of overnight and intraday return in the period from 2008 to 2009. From this period, it 
Amundsen & Bryhn 
21 
 
may seem that the overnight is highly positive and the intraday is highly negative. This could be 
the case, as earlier mentioned, a period where we could expect the intraday and overnight to 
perform differently from normal.  
 
Table 5: Final value and geometric return from 2003 to 2014 
 Close-to-close Overnight Intraday 
Final Value 
Daily Geometric Return 
$267 
- 
$1 943 
9.85 
$14 
-6.57 
Final value is given in USD and daily geometric return in basis points. 
 
Table 5 presents the final value of the three investments. Over the 12-year period the $100 
investment of overnight grows to $1 943. In comparison, the intraday investment falls to $14. 
This is where the difference between the overnight and intraday becomes clear. From the initial 
amount, the investment in the overnight grows more than nineteen times while the intraday 
decreases to less than one fifth. The geometric return of the overnight, representing the daily 
return needed to achieve the final value, equals to 9.85 basis points. In contrast, the overnight has 
a geometric return of negative 6.57 basis points. The large difference has impact on the final 
value of the close-to-close return. As the overnight is the one contributing to the final value of 
$267.  
 
In Figure 3, we plot the fluctuations of returns of day, night and close-to-close into separate 
graphs. The purpose is to give an overview of how the returns fluctuate and further investigate if 
there are clustered periods of return indicating abnormal changes in returns. In the first years, 
from 2003 to 2008, there seem to be no particular behavior in the variation of the return between 
night and day, as there is no apparent amount of high clustering. There is a constant switch 
between positive and negative returns, as this holds for both night and day. In the period from 
2008 to 2009 we find this to change. We observe the fluctuations of intraday to have large 
clustering, being the highest of all years. There is a noticeable difference between the overnight 
and intraday in this period. The intraday has a much larger clustering with higher spikes. This 
would lead us to expect that intraday is most affected by financial turmoil. The rapid variation in 
the close-to-close is a direct result of movements in the overnight and the intraday. During this 
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period, the intraday is contributing most to the fluctuations in the close-to-close. What we also 
observe is intraday, being more clustered and to have more fluctuations in return in the period 
after 2008 to 2009 than the overnight. This leads us to believe something changed in the behavior 
of the return in the period after the financial turmoil. We also see this fluctuation in the intraday 
visible in the overnight. The fluctuations of the overnight on the other hand are less strong. To 
some extend this leads us to believe the overnight and intraday share a bond, where a movement 
in intraday affects the overnight. Even though it is hard to observe the overall performance of the 
night and day, the graphs do illustrate an important picture of how both vary.  
 
Figure 3: Fluctuation in return for close-to-close, overnight and intraday from 2003 to 2014 
 
CTC equals the close-to-close. Returns are given in decimals. 
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Figure 4: Squared returns from 2003 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Returns are given in decimals. 
 
In Figure 4, we plot the squared returns of night and day. This helps to further observe if the 
overnight or intraday has the most variation in return. The orange is the squared return of the 
intraday and the red is the squared return for overnight. Visual inspection shows clustering, and 
we find the intraday holding a constantly higher fluctuation in the squared return than the 
overnight throughout the whole period. Between 2008 and 2009, it is a considerably higher 
amount of fluctuation in both squared returns. Another aspect is the difference in squared returns 
of day and night before and after the financial crisis of 2008. After 2008, the squared return for 
intraday is higher than overnight and is easily visible. This is found to be quite puzzling, as it 
might indicate that the overnight and intraday have various reactions to different market 
conditions or that we, to some extent, see a change in the behavior of the returns.  
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4.1 Presence of the Night and Day Return in Individual Stocks.   
 
In the data chapter, we presented an overview over the 15 selected securities over the period of 
2003 to 2014, by turnover and the sector they operate in. The analysis on the individual stocks is 
carried out to investigate, if there are certain securities that perform better at night than day. We 
present two of the stocks, which have performed best over the whole period that have abnormal 
returns relatively to the rest.  
 
Figure 5: Fluctuation in intraday return for individual stocks from 2003 to 2014 
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Figure 6: Fluctuation in overnight return for individual stocks from 2003 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 5 and Figure 6, we plot the returns of the intraday and the overnight for each individual 
stock. We observe each stock to have noticeable spikes over the 12-year period. We do not 
consider this to be a case of abnormal behavior, as a high fall or gain in the stock price is not 
unusual. What we do see is a combination of both positive and negative returns for night and day. 
For every stock we find the fluctuation in return to be higher for the intraday than the overnight. 
This tells us that the variation in the day return is affected by higher fluctuations. We find the 
behavior of the overnight and the intraday return to some extend being similar. As for the 
portfolio we observe the fluctuations of the intraday to be visible in the behavior overnight, as 
this holds for all stocks. If there is a high fluctuation in the intraday, we see a less fluctuation in 
the overnight. If this co-movement is negatively or positively correlated is hard to observe. The 
most clustered case period is from 2008 to 2009, as this holds for all stocks. In the period we 
observe the overnight and the intraday having larger variation in return, both positive and 
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negative. Despite this, there is no similar pattern observable separating the overnight from the 
intraday. More specifically, we do not find periods holding only positive or negative returns. In 
the earlier period, there is especially one stock that stands out. During late 2003 and start of 2004 
MHG shows large fluctuations in return
17
. By observing the night and day graphs, we find none 
of the stock to have a pattern differently than the others. The stocks follow the same behavior as 
we see in the equally weighted portfolio, which is as expected.  
 
Table 6: Daily mean and standard deviation for individual stocks from 2003 to 2014 
 
Close-to-close Return 
 SUBC  TGS TEL STL STB SCH RCL PGS ORK FRO FOE MHG PRS NHY DNO 
Mean 7.30 8.77 6.92 4.58 1.90 7.05 5.92 5.56 4.87 0.28 8.23 -4.70 2.75 4.60 10.47 
SD 3.3 3.1 2.0 1.9 3.0 2.5 2.8 3.7 1.9 3.9 2.7 6.1 2.5 2.4 3.8 
 
Overnight Return 
 SUBC  TGS TEL STL STB SCH RCL PGS ORK FRO FOE MHG PRS NHY DNO 
Mean 36.22 25.26 6.38 28.26 16.17 1.48 9.75 16.71 -30.04 -4.70 -2.89 -23.13 26.278 25.35 24.27 
SD 2.0 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.1 2.0 1.6 4.4 1.6 1.4 2.6 
 
Intraday Return 
 SUBC  TGS TEL STL STB SCH RCL PGS ORK FRO FOE MHG PRS NHY DNO 
Mean -28.92 -16.49 0.53 -23.70 -14.27 5.57 -3.82 -11.15 34.90 4.57 11.11 18.43 -23.52 -20.75 -13.80 
SD 2.7 2.6 1.7 1.6 2.7 2.3 2.3 3.2 1.7 3.2 2.3 5.6 2.2 2.0 3.1 
Mean is given as basis points and standard deviation is given as per-cent. Returns are given as arithmetic returns. 
 
In Table 6, we give a more detailed overview of the individual stocks by presenting the return 
and standard deviation of each. We find the amounts of returns to vary, but 9 out of 15 stocks 
hold a negative intraday return. The trend in the stocks is a negative intraday; as the intraday 
differs between negative 28.91 basis points to positive 34.9 basis points. The amount of return of 
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 Between the period of late 2003 and early 2004, MHG is traded between 0.03 and 0.06. Resulting in a high per-
cent change in price.   
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those with a positive intraday is found to be small, except for ORK. The overall intraday return is 
weak among the stocks. We find only 4 out of 15 stocks having a negative overnight return. The 
overnight differs from negative 30.03 basis points to positive 36.21 basis points. These results 
emphasize the fact that the intraday has played a weak role in the total return the past decade. 
Interestingly enough, the stocks with negative overnight, ORK, FRO, FOE, and MHG all perform 
with positive intraday returns. When we compare the securities with negative intraday with their 
respective overnight, we discover that most achieves positive overnights. This is a behavior we 
find hard being a coincidence. From the return graphs, we observed the intraday spikes to be 
recognized in the overnight fluctuations. With the case of stocks having reversed intraday from 
the overnight it may seem as these fluctuations are of negative relationship. For the entire sample 
the standard deviation of the intraday exceeds the standard deviation of the overnight; implying 
the variation in return to the close-to-open being less than that of the open-to-close. 
 
From the individual stocks we find SUBC having the highest amount of overnight return with 
36.21 basis points. This is a substantially higher amount of night return than the rest of the 
sample. We find ORK having the highest amount of intraday return with 34.9 basis points. As 
SUBC and ORK are having a performance exceeding every other stock in terms of intraday and 
overnight return; we want to treat them as our samples extreme cases. Further, we want to 
investigate growth one could achieve from investing solely in either the SUBC’s overnight return 
or the ORK’s intraday return. We create a plot of the cumulative return, to illustrate the return of 
night, and day one could achieve in the two cases over the period of 2003 to 2014. Initial 
investment is set to $100. The result can be observed in Figure 7. The two stocks are combined 
for a better graphical comparison.    
 
The cumulative growth in the investment in SUBC’s overnight and ORK’s intraday are very 
high. For SUBC the final value of the $100 invested in the start of 2003 is $2 846 340. For ORK 
the final value of the $100 invested in the start of 2003 is $2 330 560. Even though these 
investments do not consider transaction costs, the ending results are remarkably high. 
Interestingly, we find the returns starting to escalate in 2008. This is evident in the cumulative 
wealth they could achieve. Interestingly, when we look at them individually in the Figure 5 and 
Figure 6, both graphs of return for SUBC and ORK do not suggest any remarkable change in the 
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returns in this period. Neither does the standard deviation of SUBC of 2.0 % or the standard 
deviation of ORK of 1.7 %. The investment in SUBC multiplies by more than 28 463 times the 
initial amount. Over the whole period SUBC has a geometric return of 34.08 basis points. ORK 
achieved a growth of 23 305 times the initial investment. Over the period ORK has a geometric 
return of 33.42 basis points. There are more high performers in overnight than intraday. The 
second best stock in terms of overnight return is STL with a return of 28.26 basis points and 1.9% 
daily standard deviation from mean. The difference in the amount of return between SUBC and 
STL is moderate. The second best stock in terms of intraday is MHG with a return of 18.42 basis 
points and a daily standard deviation of 5.6%. The difference in the amount of return between 
ORK and MHG is large.  
 
Figure 7: Cumulative wealth for ORK and SUBC from 2003 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wealth is given in USD. 
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4.2 Predictive Abilities of the Night and Day Relationship 
 
The constant large difference between the return of overnight and intraday led us towards an 
analysis of the relationship between the returns. We investigate if the night returns tend to move 
in the opposite direction of the day returns. We also see if the night returns has a relation to the 
previous day returns of overnight and intraday
18
. This is done by conducting a correlation on the 
returns of each individual stock. A brief illustration of the process can be examined below. 
 
[                          ]                             
 
We correlate the overnight with the subsequent intraday return. This will tell us whether the 
return of overnight and subsequent intraday tends to move in a similar direction, or not. We also 
add correlation with the overnight correlated on the previous day value of overnight and intraday 
return. The reason is to observe whether the overnight return tends to move in the same or 
opposite direction of the previous day returns.  
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 Where: intradayt is defined as the return of [closet-opent];  
overnight is defined as the return of [opent-closet-1];  
overnight-1 is defined as the return of [opent-1-closet-2];  
intradayt-1 is defined as the return of [closet-1-opent-1].  
Table 7: Correlation coefficients for the individual stocks 
Ticker    Intradayt Overnightt-1 Intradayt-1 
STL -0.0029 0.0047 -0.0438 
NHY -0.0135 -0.0658 0.0273 
TEL 0.0134 -0.0771 0.0023 
ORK -0.1415 -0.0206 0.0454 
PGS 0.0146 -0.0631 0.0293 
MHG -0.2772 0.0051 -0.0274 
FRO 0.0386 0.0187 -0.0644 
DNO -0.1177 -0.0532 -0.0874 
SUBC -0.0611 -0.0537 0.0029 
RCL 0.0584 -0.0285 0.0356 
STB -0.0740 -0.0365 0.0168 
TGS 0.0094 0.0063 0.0509 
PRS -0.1468 -0.0114 0.0184 
FOE -0.0853 -0.0038 -0.0129 
SCH -0.1350 0.0117 0.0200 
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In Table 7, the result of the correlation analysis can be examined. In the result majority of the 
stocks holds a negative correlation between the return of overnight and subsequent intraday. 
More specifically, return of the overnight and subsequent intraday tends to vary in opposite 
directions. This leads us to believe the difference between the overnight and intraday can to some 
extend be explained by the negative relationship of the returns. We find the correlations to be of a 
low degree, implying the relationship between night and day being weak. Even so, we need to 
take into consideration that we operate with daily returns. A result of low correlation is thus to be 
expected. What is interesting is the fact that majority of the stocks hold a negative correlation 
between night and day. The negative correlations of the stocks differ from 0.0029 to negative 
0.2772. The positive correlated differ from 0.0094 to 0.0584. Moreover we find the stocks 
holding a negative correlation between the return of night and subsequent day to be of higher 
degree. As we compute the correlation between the overnight and the lagged values of night and 
day, we observe that the degree decreases. The results are highly mixed, and we find no 
indication towards a clear relationship between current overnight and the previous trading day 
return. Our result reveals a tendency, where the overnight and subsequent intraday moves in 
opposite directions. On the other hand, the returns of the overnight and previous day the tendency 
is mixed between positive and negative correlation, and therefore, does not give a consistent 
picture. 
  
The results of the correlation led us towards a regression analysis. We question if the negative 
correlation between night and day have a predictive ability, more specifically, if the overnight 
can forecast the return of the subsequent intraday. We run a simple ordinary least square 
regression, where the intraday return is regressed on a set of independent variables, including the 
overnight return and the previous day return of overnight and intraday. When performing the 
regression, we assume our data to be normally distributed. We can express the regression line as 
following:  
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The main reason for limiting the regression to three independent variables is the research done by 
Branch and Ma (2012), where they also run a similar regression as they quote: “Apparently 
adding more regressors does not dilute the explanatory power of the overnight coefficient […]. 
Nor does adding more regressors increase the overall explanatory power of our basic model.” 
(Branch & Ma, 2012, p.1) Therefore, we do not include more independent variables and we 
perform the analysis with a basic linear model. By running the regression we expect a low 
explanatory power taking into consideration that we operate with daily financial data. 
 
Table 8: Regression coefficients for the individual stocks 
 
Ticker β0    β1      β2 β3         
STL -0.0023 
(-7.636) 
-0.0020 
(-0.073) 
-0.0656 
(-2.427) 
-0.0680 
(-3.742) 
0.0041 
NHY -0.0024 
(-6.292) 
-0.0077 
(-0.297) 
0.0364 
(1.401) 
-0.1029 
(-5.662) 
0.0104 
TEL 0.0002 
(0,487) 
-0.1140 
(-3,826) 
-0.0478 
(-1,601) 
-0.0694 
(-3,816) 
0.0088 
ORK 0.0032 
(9,582) 
-0.2206 
(-7,775) 
0.0507 
(1,768) 
-0.0735 
(-4,046) 
0.0262 
PGS -0.0013 
(2,244) 
0.0356 
(1,167) 
0.0529 
(1.741) 
-0.0584 
(-3.201) 
0.0035 
MHG 0.0010 
(1.025) 
-0.4029 
(-17.628) 
-0.0856 
(-3.742) 
-0.1513 
(-8.046) 
0.0961 
FRO 0.0004 
(0.711) 
0.0575 
(1.982) 
-0.1065 
(-3.580) 
0.0462 
(2.530) 
0.0068 
DNO -0.0009 
(-1.574) 
-0.1339 
(-6.299) 
-0.1217 
(-5.716) 
-0.0853 
(-4.692) 
0.0288 
SUBC -0.0026 
(-5.008) 
-0.0830 
(-3.340) 
0.0121 
(0.0663) 
0.0006 
(0.024) 
0.0028 
RCL -0.0005 
(-1.232) 
0.0870 
(3.173) 
0.0541 
(1.980) 
0.0199 
(1.090) 
0.0042 
STB -0.0013 
(-2.531) 
-0.1424 
(-4.059) 
0.0268 
(0.763) 
-0.0072 
(-0.393) 
0.0048 
TGS -0.0020 
(-4.141) 
0.0119 
(0.409) 
0.0824 
(2.830) 
-0.0606 
(-3.336) 
0.0053 
PRS -0.0018 
(-4.432) 
-0.2015 
(-8.095) 
0.0293 
(1.166) 
0.0349 
(1.916) 
0.0221 
FOE 0.0011 
(2.518) 
-0.1225 
(-4.563) 
-0.0174 
(-0.647) 
0.0067 
(0.367) 
0.0061 
SCH 0.0006 
(1.431) 
-0.2257 
(-7.575) 
0.0304 
(1.015) 
-0.0225 
(-1.231) 
0.0182 
Where the coefficient for intercept is   , overnightt is   , overnightt-1 is    and intradayt-1 is   . 
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In Table 8, the result of the regression analysis can be examined. A quick scan of the estimate 
values reveals that majority of our overnight coefficients are negative. The interpretation is a 
minor increase in the overnight return, by 1 %, would decrease the expected value of the intraday 
return in the opposite direction by the amount of the overnight coefficient. Taking into 
consideration the coefficients being estimated from daily returns our results are strong. We find 4 
stocks, where 2 are insignificant
19
 to hold a positive correlation with the intraday and 11 stocks, 
where 2 are insignificant to hold a negative correlation with the intraday. This is consistent with 
the result we presented in the previous topic, where the return of night and day for majority of the 
stocks held a negative correlation. The negative coefficients of the overnight, which are 
significant, differ from 0.4029 to 0.0830. A possible interpretation of the weak intraday 
performance could be because of the strong overnight movements. The higher return of the 
overnight our model states, the weaker we would expect the intraday return to be. Our result 
could explain some of the large difference between the return of overnight and intraday we 
observe over the 12-year period.  
 
From the estimated coefficients of the relation between intraday with the lagged overnight we 
only find 5 to be significant. We also observe the sign of the coefficients to be highly mixed.  
This means that previous trading day overnight has little or no particular relation with the 
expected intraday. From the estimated coefficients of the relation between intraday with the 
lagged intraday we find majority to be significant. As follows, the coefficients are mostly 
negative. This indicates that the lagged intraday predicts the expected value of the intraday to 
move in the opposite direction. More specifically, a positive return in the lagged intraday would 
result in a less positive or negative return in the subsequent intraday.  
 
The explanatory power of our model differs, depending on the stock, between the r-squared 
values of 0.0028 to 0.0961. Statistically interpreted, our predictive model explains 0.028 % to 
9.61 % of the total variation in the intraday movements of the stocks. An explanatory power 
which is modest, but taking into consideration that we operate with daily financial data, the 
results are not bad. Even though the explanatory power is modest, we can say our results point 
towards the existence of a relationship between the overnight and intraday return and that we find 
                                                          
19
 A coefficient being insignificant means that we cannot reject the hypothesis of the true coefficient being zero.   
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the lagged variables to give a weaker prediction compared to the overnight. Our result indicates 
that there exists a predictive relationship between the returns.  
4.3 Does the Behaviour of the Night and Day Return Change over Time 
 
We questioned if it was normal with a constant change between positive and negative returns of 
overnight and intraday, more specifically, if some periods have a larger amount of days ending 
with a negative return of overnight or intraday than others. To investigate this, we perform a 
robustness test by analysing the overnight and intraday by returns of individual weekdays, 
months and years. We also decompose the whole period into two sub-periods from 2003 to 2008 
and 2009 to 2014.  
 
When we investigate individual weekdays, we find the same behaviour of strong overnight and 
weak intraday return. 
 
Table 9: Weekday returns from 2003 to 2014  
Day Close-to-close Overnight Intraday Difference Days with returns 
Monday -2.04 10.56 -12.59 23.16 591 
Tuesday 1.20 7.63 -6.42 14.06 615 
Wednesday 2.93 8.24 -5.31 13.57 614 
Thursday 2.51 10.95 -8.44 19.39 591 
Friday 20.13 14.63 5.49 9.15 603 
All 4.96 10.39 -5.42 15.81 3014 
Returns are given in basis points. The difference is computed by subtracting the overnight from the intraday. Returns 
are given as arithmetic returns.  
 
In Table 9, the result of decomposing the equally weighted portfolio into individual weekdays 
can be examined. We find the strong overnight return to hold for all weekdays. The overnight is 
purely positive and differs from 7.63 basis points to 14.64 basis points. There are especially two 
interesting findings for the overnight return: Firstly, the Monday overnight, which here is 
represented as the difference between Monday open and Friday close, is positive with 10.56 basis 
points. This tells us, historically speaking, that an investment over the weekend would result in a 
positive return. Secondly, we observe the overnight return to be increasing following Monday. 
This leads us to believe that there is a tendency, where the overnight performs better as the week 
progress. On the contrary, the intraday is negative on all days except on Friday. Compared to the 
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overnight, the intraday does not show behaviour as to a continuous improvement in the return, as 
the week progresses. Even so, we find the returns to differ from negative 12.59 basis points to 
positive 5.49 basis points. We question why the return of Friday intraday is exceeding the rest of 
the weekdays so much in performance. The positive return we observe for the overnight return on 
Monday is highly negative in the intraday return. We find the overnight contributing most to the 
overall positive close-to-close return. In fact, the overnight is persistently higher than that of the 
intraday for any day of the week.  
 
Table 10: Amount of weekdays with negative return from 2003 to 2014 
Overnight Intraday 
Weekday Negative days Total days % Weekday Negative days Total days % 
Monday 233 591 39.42 Monday 283 591 47.88 
Tuesday 258 615 41.95 Tuesday 326 615 53.01 
Wednesday 268 614 43.65 Wednesday 306 614 49.84 
Thursday 241 591 40.78 Thursday 301 591 50.93 
Friday 224 603 37.15 Friday 272 603 45.11 
Per-cent is given as amount of negative days divided by total days 
 
Similar to the whole period we compute the amount of trading days ending with a negative return 
for each weekday. We found the amount of overnight days ending with a negative return over the 
whole period to be 40 %. The results for the individual weekdays can be examined in Table 10. A 
quick inspection reveals the ratio to also hold for each individual weekday. There are none of the 
weekdays that have a remarkably higher amount of negative days. For the intraday, we found 49 
% of the total observed days to end with a negative return. Similar, we do not find a day having a 
specifically abnormal ratio. What we can add is the Friday and Monday having the least amount 
of trading days ending with a negative result, as this holds for both the intraday and overnight. 
Even so it gives little indication on why Fridays return is so much better. This makes us believe 
that the amount of return on Friday tends to be higher than the rest of the week and that the 
returns by weekdays do not reveal a day behaving differently than the other ones.  
 
Now, we separate the return of overnight and intraday into their respective months, this can be 
examined in Table 11. 
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Table 11: Return by months from 2003 to 2014 
 
Month Close-to-close Overnight Intraday Difference Days with return 
January 0.63 15.39 -14.76 30.15 257 
February 0.02 9.24 -9.25 18.49 242 
Mars 6.58 6.31 0.27 6.03 257 
April 18.11 11.63 6.48 5.15 230 
May 7.24 -0.20 7.44 -7.63 234 
June 4.85 15.25 -10.40 25.65 251 
July 9.69 13.73 -4.04 17.77 266 
August 0.35 8.61 -8.26 16.87 265 
September -9.60 8.76 -18.36 27.12 258 
October -10.48 15.06 -25.54 40.60 266 
November 5.66 11.98 -6.32 18.30 256 
December 25.74 9.53 16.22 -6.69 232 
All 4.96 10.39 -5.42 15.81 3014 
Returns are given in basis points. The difference is computed by subtracting the overnight from the intraday. Returns 
are given as arithmetic returns.  
 
Results of separating the daily return into their respective month emphasize the difference 
between the overnight and intraday return. We find the result of high overnight and weak 
intraday to hold for the months as well. All the monthly returns of overnight are positive, with an 
exception of May. The returns differ from negative 0.20 basis points to positive 15.39 basis 
points. As of this, we can say that the overnight has a stable performance in almost all months. 
For the intraday the results are more mixed. The returns of intraday differ from negative 25.54 
basis points to positive 16.22 basis points. We find here, as in the individual weekdays, the 
overnight to contribute the most to the overall close-to-close return. There are especially two 
remarks of the results. Firstly, we observe a highly negative intraday, often being responded with 
a similar high positive overnight. This does not hold the other way around, but we observe the 
negative overnight of May to have a strong positive return for the intraday. The interesting part is 
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that the gap between the overnight and intraday is consistently high. Even though we find the 
intraday to be positive in four months, the divergence between night and day is still at a 
difference of at least +/- 5 basis points. Secondly, we observe the only two months the intraday 
exceeding the overnight being May and December. Implying that we might expect the behaviour 
we see rest of the year to be different in these months.  
 
Following this, we separate the return of overnight and intraday into their respective years, this 
can be examined in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Returns by year from 2003 to 2014 
Year Close-to-close Overnight Intraday Difference Days with return 
2014 -3.85 15.82 -19.68 35.50 250 
2013 8.28 9.40 -1.12 10.52 249 
2012 7.62 10.20 -2.58 12.78 251 
2011 -12.73 6.36 -19.10 25.46 253 
2010 10.07 13.52 -3.45 16.98 252 
2009 21.95 27.08 -5.12 32.20 251 
2008 -36.51 15.81 -52.33 68.14 252 
2007 0.68 0.58 0.09 0.49 250 
2006 13.08 14.19 -1.10 15.29 251 
2005 20.68 10.78 9.89 0.89 253 
2004 14.00 -14.07 28.07 -42.14 253 
2003 16.41 15.09 1.32 13.78 249 
All 4.96 10.39 -5.42 15.81 3014 
Returns are given in basis points. The difference is computed by subtracting the overnight from the intraday. Returns 
are given as arithmetic returns.  
 
We find the strong overnight and weak intraday to hold across the yearly measures. The 
overnight, which again performs with strong positive returns, differ from negative 14.07 to 27.08 
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basis points, where 1 out of 12 years are negative. From the computation we find the overnight 
contributing substantial to the positive return of the close-to-close. The overnight consistently 
perform stronger compared to the intraday. The intraday differs from negative 52.33 to 28.07 
basis points, where 8 out of 12 years are negative. 2004 is the only year, where overnight has a 
negative return, but on the other hand, is the year with highest return for intraday. Including 2008 
and the last 6-years of our dataset after the financial crisis, all the intraday returns are negative. 
The overnight is purely positive and is the only one contributing to a positive close-to-close 
return. This indicates that most of the recovery after the financial crisis can solely be explained 
by the performance of the night return. Interestingly, we find the overnight to be positive in the 
financial turmoil of 2008. In the year of 2008 overnight had a mean of 15.81 basis points, while 
intraday had negative 52.33 basis points. Not only does the overnight hold positive average 
returns during what would logically be believed to be a highly negative period, but the non-
trading hours also performs with an average among 3 of the highest returns of all the years.  
 
As follows, we divide our sample into two sub-periods; this is done for the purpose to further 
investigate the movements of the overnight and intraday return, since the two periods have 
different market situation. During the period from 2003 to 2008 the benchmark index is mainly 
driven by a bull-market until the financial crisis of 2008. The second period of 2009 to 2014 can 
be characterized as a bull market with no persistent bear-period, only small corrections. This is 
also a period, where the benchmark index has reached an all-time high. The aim is to study the 
effects of these market situations. To simplify the presentation of the results of the two periods, 
we present them separately, while the differences are examined in the discussion.   
 
The result of the analysis of the period from 2003 to 2008 revealed moderate overnight and weak 
intraday return. 
 
Table 13: Return and standard deviation from 2003 to 2008 
 Close-to-close Overnight Intraday 
Mean 4.7 7.1 -2.3 
Standard deviation 1.9 1.2 1.5 
Mean is given as basis points and standard deviation is given in per-cent. Returns are given as arithmetic returns. 
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In Table 13, we present our findings of studying the night and day returns over the period. A 
quick view reveals that the amounts of returns for both night and day are less compared to the 
whole period. This implies that there is a higher amount of returns in the second period. When 
analysing the whole period, we were left with the impression that there is a change in the amount 
of overnight and intraday return after the period of 2008 to 2009. In the preceding years, we 
observed mainly positive returns, both for night and day. Even so, we find the average intraday 
return for the first period to be of negative 2.3 basis points. We find this to be mainly due to the 
high negative return in 2008, as excluding the last year of the period would make the intraday 
return positive. On the other hand, we find the overnight to exhibit a positive return of 7.1 basis 
points, in spite of finding the overnight return to be negative in 2004. We also note that the 
standard deviation of the intraday of 1.5% is higher than the daily standard deviation of the 
overnight of 1.2%. This is expected, as we found this to hold for both the whole period and every 
individual stock.  
 
We compute the amount of days ending with a negative return during closure and opening hours, 
as can be examined in Table 14. 
  
Table 14: Amount of days with negative return from 2003 to 2008 
Period Days with negative return Total % 
Overnight 656 1508 43.50 
Intraday 723 1508 47.94 
Per-cent is given as amount of negative days divided by total days. 
 
For the whole period we found the ratio for the amount of negative trading days to be 49 % for 
the intraday and 41 % for the overnight. In the first 6-years, we find the intraday to have 47.94 % 
of total days with a negative return and the overnight to have 43.50 % of total days with a 
negative return. As for this, the ratio is similar to the whole period. The observed lower amount 
of positive overnight and negative intraday returns can thus not be explained by a high number of 
negative trading days.   
 
To illustrate the difference we observe between the overnight and the intraday of the period, we 
graphically plot the growth of $100 invested in the return one could achieve investing daily in 
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either the night or day period. We add the close-to-close return as well. The mathematical 
procedure is the same as for the whole period.  
  
Figure 8: Cumulative wealth from 2003 to 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial invest amount $100. CTC equals the investment in the close-to-close. 
 
In the first years, the intraday performs strong as it reaches a peak of around $300. We actually 
observe the intraday investment to exceed the overnight investment for most of the period.  
On the other hand, after reaching the peak in 2006 the following years are negative. This 
negativity is clearly intensified by financial turmoil in 2008. The overnight, on the other hand, 
have a steady behaviour after the negative return we observed in 2004. Interestingly, we see that 
even though the intraday is decreasing, the overnight is steadily increasing. Observing the close-
to-close reveals the intraday to have a large effect on the negative return in the last years. 
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Table 15: Final value and geometric return from 2003 to 2008 
 Close-to-close Overnight Intraday 
Final Value 
Daily Geometric Return 
$153 
- 
$258 
6.29 
$58 
-3.51 
Final value is given in USD and daily geometric return in basis points. 
 
In Table 15, the final values of the investments can be examined. Over 1509 active trading days, 
the investment in the intraday delivers a geometric return of negative 3.51 basis points. A 
relatively bad overall performance considering a normal investment by close-to-close would lead 
to a final value of $153. The final value of the intraday is $153. On the other hand, the overnight 
return, performing consistently strong, has a final value of $258. This is the same as a geometric 
return of positive 6.29 basis points. 
 
The result of the analysing the period of 2009 to 2014 revealed high overnight and weak intraday 
return. 
 
Table 16: Return and standard deviation from 2009 to 2014 
 Close-to-close Overnight Intraday 
Mean 4.8 13.7 -8.9 
Standard deviation 1.7 0.8 1.5 
Mean is given as basis points and standard deviation is given in per-cent. Returns are given as arithmetic returns. 
 
In Table 16, we present our findings of studying the night and day returns over the period. We 
questioned if we saw a change in the behaviour of the returns in 2008 to 2009. This seems to be 
the case. The results reveal the amount of returns for both night and day to be higher than the 
overall and first sub-period. The return of the intraday is negative 8.9 basis points. This is not as 
we expected considering the state of the overall market. Even though the market is in what we 
defined as a bull-state the intraday keeps underperforming. We find the overnight to have a daily 
average return of 13.7 basis points. Taking into consideration that our returns are of daily values 
of 1506 active trading days, we find the returns to be high. Even more interesting is the higher 
amount of return in the second period than the first. The standard deviation of the intraday is 1.5 
% and the standard deviation of the overnight is 0.8 %. We observe the standard deviation of the 
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intraday to be equal to the first period and the standard deviation of the overnight to decrease. 
Both for the overnight and intraday to decrease and to be equal is strange. We would expect a 
higher amount of returns to equally be reflected by a higher amount of standard deviation. This is 
not the case.  
 
We compute the number of days ending with a positive return during closure and opening hours, 
as can be examined in Table 17. 
 
Table 17: Amount of days with negative return from 2009 to 2014 
Period Days with negative return Total % 
Overnight 568 1506 37.72% 
Intraday 765 1506 50.80% 
Per-cent is given as amount of negative days divided by total days. 
 
For the whole period, we found the ratio for the amount of negative trading days to be 49 % for 
the intraday and 41 % for the overnight. In the last 6-years we find the intraday to have 50.80 % 
of total days with a negative return and the overnight to have 37.72 % of total days with a 
negative return. As for this, the ratio is similar to the whole period. The higher amount of positive 
overnight and negative intraday returns can thus not be explained by a high number of negative 
trading days.   
 
To illustrate the difference we observe between the overnight and the intraday of the period, we 
graphically plot the growth of $100 invested in the return one could achieve investing daily in 
either the night or day period. We add the close-to-close return as well. The mathematical 
procedure is the same for the whole period. 
 
The 6-year period emphasizes the significant difference between the overnight and the intraday. 
From the start of 2009 to 2014, the overnight is consistently higher than the intraday. As we see 
the investment of overnight substantially increase and the intraday falling towards zero.   
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Figure 9: Cumulative wealth from 2009 to 2014  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial invest amount $100. CTC equals the investment in the close-to-close. 
 
In Table 18, the final values of the investments can be examined. The $100 night investment is 
consecutively performing better than the day investment. The overnight has a final value of $751 
compared to the intraday of $22. The overall close-to-close has a final value of $165.Over the 
1506 trading days the intraday delivers a daily geometric return of negative 9.962 basis points, 
while the overnight 13.272 basis points.  
 
Table 18: Final value and geometric return from 2009 to 2014 
 Close-to-close Overnight Intraday 
Final Value 
Daily Geometric Return 
$165 
- 
$752 
13.3 
$2 
-10.0 
Final value is given in USD and daily geometric return in basis points. 
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5. Discussion 
 
After inspecting the relationship between the overnight and intraday return it is evident, the 
important role non-trading hours has had on the overall performance of our sample. Over the 12-
year period, we find high overnight and low intraday returns. Our results are similar to the above-
mentioned empirical studies introduced in the literature. Even though we investigate the return of 
night and day on a set of individual stocks rather than a complete market, we still find positive 
returns of overnight and negative returns of intraday. The overnight is persistently high, and the 
intraday is constantly weak. There is no surprise that the returns during trading hours vary, but 
we find it strange that there seem to be no compensation for holding assets through a fluctuating 
day. Majority of our stocks are found to hold a negative, at best zero, “risk-return trade-off”20 as 
holding a risky asset gives no payoff during trading hours. As the intraday is found to fluctuate 
more in return than the overnight, one would expect the return to reflect the greater risk. This 
seems not to be the case.  
 
Cliff, Gulen and Cooper (2006) document average overnight returns for each individual weekday 
to be positive. This holds for our result as well. Despite similar findings, they do not find the 
behavior where returns overnight increase as the week progress. We on the other hand, find 
weekday returns to steadily increase and Friday to have the highest average return. Our result is 
relevant to the anomaly familiarized in the introduction; the Day of the Week Effect, where the 
daily return of a stock is found to increase with the week’s progression. Studies of the Day of the 
Week Effect operate with close-to-close returns (e.g. Dubois & Louvet, 1996). Our result adds a 
new view.  When we divide our return into overnight and intraday we find the increasing 
weekday return solely caused by overnight returns. The average overnight return for the 
weekdays gradually increases, as this is easily observable
21
. To some extend, we find the intraday 
to perform better as the Friday return is positive, but the increase is not clearly visible as the 
overnight. The remaining weekdays of the intraday are negative. Our result leads us to believe 
that the Day of the Week Effect mainly returns over non-trading hours rather than trading hours.  
 
                                                          
20
 Bodie, Kane & Marcus (2011) p. 37-38. 
21
 See Table 9, page 34. 
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The study by French (1980) found average weekend returns to be negative 16 basis points from 
1953 to 1977. As mentioned in introductory part, this occurrence is known as the Weekend 
Effect. According to the anomaly, the weekend is not supposed to exhibit any form of positive 
return. Past studies operated with close-to-close returns and likewise when we use close-to-close 
returns, we find the weekend return to be of negative value. The overnight return of a weekend is 
represented as the difference between Monday open and previous Fridays close. It is, therefore, 
the best measurement for studying the true return over a weekend. It does not consider 
movements in the return after the opening, neither before the close. It should be the best 
indicators to see if there exists a return over the weekend. Cliff, Gulen and Cooper (2006) found 
overnight return of the Monday to be positive. Our Monday overnight return is 10.56 basis 
points. This raises the question on the validity of the Weekend Effect. Our results imply that the 
weekend itself is not experiencing negative returns. It is the intraday of negative 12.60 basis 
points that exceeds the overnight, resulting in a negative close-to-close return. We find a possible 
explanation to why the overnight is positive and the intraday is negative to be the case of a 
market correction. The high increase in the Friday stock price, as we document, might be 
corrected by a following low return on the intraday of Monday. This might be the case, where 
investors hold their stocks over the weekend and then, settle the position during trading hours of 
Monday. The effect of an aggregated amount of investors wanting to settle their position on 
Friday would lead to a decrease in the stock price.      
 
Although we find positive overnight returns for the weekend and individual weekdays, the 
amount of days ending with positive return holds for 60 % of the total observations. A varying 
performance might indicate that we could expect certain periods of the 12-year analysis to 
perform differently from the other ones. Separating average daily returns into monthly values, 
gives mixed results. We find the overnight of January to perform best, but not with an amount we 
find differently from the rest of the months. On the other hand, we observe May being the only 
month holding a negative overnight return and we question why. Potentially this could indicate 
an irregular pattern in the returns as to what we see for the rest of the year. In Norway, the month 
of May has numerous non-trading days, in this case holidays. The negative overnight could be a 
reversed process of the Holiday Effect, shown in the introduction. According to Ariel (1990), 
high return pre-holidays are to be persistent across trading hours. It should thus affect the 
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intraday. We do in fact find the second highest positive average intraday return in the month of 
May. Not only is the overnight negative, but the intraday exceeds it by far. We find the same 
behavior in December, where we observe high positive intraday return exceeding the overnight 
return. December like May has several non-trading days. A possible explanation is the case, 
where investors hold their position longer and are reluctantly to sell. This would explain the 
increase in the intraday return, where a larger demand for a stock and an investor being 
reluctantly to sell increases the closing value, and thus, the intraday return. On the other hand, 
this does not explain the negative and weak overnight. Throughout our sample, we see a large 
difference between the return of night and day. A possibility is the negative correlation between 
night and day (Branch & Ma, 2012), as we document, being strong during May and December. If 
this is the case, we would expect the positive intraday return to have the opposite effect on the 
overnight return. 
 
As we turn to yearly returns we surprisingly find the turmoil of 2008 to 2009 holding good results 
for the overnight. Not only does the overnight hold positive average returns during what would 
logically be believed to be a highly negative period, but the non-trading hours also perform with 
an average among 3 of the highest returns of all the years. In contrast, the intraday underperforms 
in 2008 with high negative returns. Our result for the intraday is as expected, but we question 
why the overnight is so strong. The study of Cliff, Gulen and Cooper (2006) for the period of 
1993 to 2006 includes the dot-com-bubble crash
22
. They report negative overnights in both 2001 
and 2002 following the bubble-burst. This opposite of what we find in 2008 and 2009. Since it is 
inappropriate to compare two crises, not to mention on different exchanges, it gives us no 
indication as to why the overnight is so high during turmoil. Even so, it might seem as the 
overnight is independent from the current market situation. So, the overnight seem averagely 
strong during a bull period.   
 
When we analyze the two sub periods we observe that our results may indicate a shift in the 
pattern of return. In the first sub-period we find the intraday to perform well as majority of the 
measured years hold positive means. For the intraday to hold a positive return, the close has to 
beat the opening price. This happens frequently as 4 out of 5 years hold a positive average daily 
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return. Following this, we observe the intraday to change by persistently holding a negative daily 
mean for the subsequent years after 2007. Even though we find the daily average close-to-close 
to be similar for both sub periods, 4.7 and 4.8 basis points respectively, there is a clear difference 
in the amount of overnight and intraday return between the two sub periods. In fact, the overall 
negative intraday return from the first to the second period increases more than three times. The 
overnight almost doubles. This is interesting, as we would not expect the trading hours to exhibit 
so much negative return. Even more interestingly, we observe the overnight to perform more 
steadily. The daily average standard deviation from the first to the second period falls from 0.3% 
to 1.2%. The standard deviation of the intraday remains unchanged. From this it can be stated that 
the increased returns of overnight and intraday are not because of an increased fluctuation in the 
returns. More specifically, the overnight deviates less from its mean of 13.727 basis points. The 
opening price more frequently outperforms the previous days close and by far. Not only do we 
observe a weak closing price, than that of the next day opening, but also a higher opening price. 
This leads us to believe the second period holds fluctuations in the returns more centralized at the 
after-opening and pre-closing hours. Meaning a high opening price followed by a weak closing 
price. Cliff, Gulen and Cooper (2006) divided the overnight and intraday into 4 different 
segments of the trading day
23
. They found the after auction hours of AM (8:30 to 9:30) to exhibit 
a negative average return over the period of 1993 to 2006. This implies a negative average return 
following the opening. As the day would progress, the various time intervals of returns would 
gradually improve and daily performance of a stock would be highest close to trading stop. So, 
the accumulated intraday would still be negative. This might be what we see in our situation, but 
at a stronger magnitude.   
 
The paper of Hong and Wang (2000) states the volatility of the trading hours, holding a U-shaped 
pattern. This suggests high volatility at the opening and the closing hours. This has implications 
for the return of overnight, as one buys and sells at these points of time. If the price is driven up 
during opening from the previous close, then the overnight would benefit from a low buy and 
high sell price. This could be the behavior we see occurring and is a potential explanation to why 
we observe such high overnight returns in the second period. After the crisis of 2008, we see 
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 Cliff, Gulen and Cooper (2006, e.g. p.30) divided the day into 4 segments: Night (4 PM-9:30 AM), AM (9:30-
10.30), Mid-day (10:30-3:00), and PM (3:00-4:00). 
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higher amount of overnight. This could be the result of higher volatility in the market. Schwert 
(1989) finds volatility to increase after a financial crisis. Due to an increase in volatility, investor 
can shorten their investment horizon and be more reluctant to sit with stocks during non-trading 
hours. More specifically, this can result in a high amount of investors settling their position at the 
end of the day, which would decrease the closing price. If there are no investors willingly to hold 
a stock overnight, then the positive night return we observe might be in a form of illiquidity 
premium. This leaves some evidence towards the theory of Longstaff, (1995) stating the non-
trading hours are rewarded with a premium, where a non-marketability effect, a period where no 
stocks are traded, is the cause of positive overnight.   
 
Another reasonable explanation for the change in the amount of overnight and intraday return 
might be the case of semiprofessional
24
 day traders, as according to Clark and Kelly (2011). In a 
volatile market, there is most likely to be a higher amount of investors betting on the daily 
movement of the market. The situation, where semiprofessional day traders settle and open their 
positions would cause a liquidation effect. Reluctantly, to hold stocks over a non-trading period, 
where they would be unable to sell, would push traders to buy in the early trading hours and sell 
close to closure. The price of a stock would be affected by the buy and sell behavior of the 
semiprofessional day traders. The early buy would push the open price up and the late sell would 
push the closing price down. An aggregated amount of the day trader behavior would have strong 
effect on the overnight, as it would gain on the low close and high open. The intraday would lose. 
In fact, it follows from the study of Goldberg and Lupercio (2004) that the semiprofessional day 
traders had a large impact on the trading volume of NYSE and NASDAQ in 2003. It does not 
imply if the same holds for OSE, even so it could be a potential explanation to what we see 
occurring in our second sub-period.  
 
In our results we find 11 out of the 15 stocks to hold positive overnight return. We find especially 
two stocks having remarkably strong amount of returns. We consider these as the two extreme 
cases of our sample. The stocks are SUBC and ORK. SUBC delivers high overnight return while 
ORK delivers high intraday return. Both SUBC and ORK show different qualities regarding the 
reward for holding the stock. We believe ORKs intraday to be firm specific as the risk and 
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reward during the day is substantially higher than the rest and not representation of the behavior 
of the other stocks in the sample.  
 
The strong difference between the return of overnight and intraday let us towards a correlation 
analysis. Branch and Ma (2012) found strong empirical evidence towards the overnight and the 
intraday holding a relationship, where the two returns tend to move in opposite directions. 
However, they discover that a higher market capitalization would result in less amount of 
negative correlation. Based on this, since our stocks have a high market capitalization, we would 
expect a weak relationship between the overnight and the intraday return. Results reveal the 
majority of our stocks to have a negative correlation and of a low degree, this is thus, on par with 
Branch and Ma (2012) findings. On the other hand, it is important to notice that we operate with 
daily financial data, and that low correlations are to be expected. The result helps us partly 
explain why the difference between overnight and intraday is so large. The two returns tend to 
vary in opposite direction, but the correlations are modest. We extended the analysis by adding 
lagged values of the intraday and the overnight. This was carried out to see whether the 
relationship holds for preceding returns or not. Branch and Ma (2012), found the correlation to be 
consistent when using lagged returns. Our results on the other hand, are highly mixed. We find no 
tendency about whether there exists a correlation with the lagged variables or not.  
   
Since there exists a correlation between the overnight and intraday, it led us to conduct a 
regression. We investigated if the overnight return held a predicting ability to the intraday return. 
We used the intraday return as the dependent variable. The independent variable consisted of the 
overnight, but also the lagged returns of intraday and overnight. Our prediction revealed negative 
coefficients with overnight and majority statistical significant. This implied that a minor change 
in the overnight return would change the expected value of the intraday in the opposite direction. 
This result is similar to Branch and Ma (2012). Our coefficients with lagged variables have a 
mixed result. We found the lagged intraday to have a negative coefficients with the intraday and 
the lagged overnight to show no consistent pattern. Branch and Ma (2012) found majority of the 
coefficients with lagged variables to be negative. As follows, our results using lagged variables 
are different.  Despite this, the correlation and regression have results that are both contracting 
the EMH and the Theory of Random Walk. There should be no benefits of using historical prices 
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to predict and find a relationship between overnight and intraday. Even so, we find the existence 
of a related night and day relationship. 
 
There are some implications connected to overnight and intraday strategies that are not taken into 
consideration in this thesis. Firstly, we do not consider transaction costs when calculating returns. 
Secondly, there could be difficulties with buying and selling at both open and closed conditions. 
We discuss these difficulties and what consequences they might have on the returns when 
considering intraday and overnight as an investment opportunity. When discussing transactions 
cost, our primary focus is on trading fees when buying and selling securities.     
 
We have different strategies to obtain returns, by considering close-to-close return, intraday and 
overnight. Each needs different buy and sell strategies. The close-to-close does not need daily 
transactions to capture the return, and the holder can simply buy at a close and sell at a close, 
when the investor wants to cancel the position. The longer the investor holds the stock, the less 
impact the transaction cost has on the return. On the other hand, an intraday investor needs 2 
daily transactions. He needs to buy at opening price and then, sell at the closing price, on the 
same day. For a positive payoff this implies the investor need a return exceeding the transaction 
cost. Same holds for the overnight investor. He buys at the closing price and sells at the opening 
price. This means that both the intraday and the overnight return have large amount of transaction 
costs over a period. As an example consider Nordea, which offers its private costumers a 
transaction fee of 5 basis points
25
 per trade. The return of an overnight or intraday investment 
would need to be equal or greater than 10 basis points daily. This happens rarely in our case, and 
the fee alone would exceed the daily return in most of the stocks both for the night and day 
period.  
 
To create the equally weighted portfolio strategies, there is substantial amount of transaction 
costs. In order to create close-to-close portfolio, the investor needs to buy an equal amount in all 
15 stocks at close price and sell at the close price, when the investor wants to cancel his position. 
Typically, the investor needs to pay a fee for each stock and each transaction, totaling to 15 fees 
to manually create the portfolio also 15 transactions to close his position. Both intraday and 
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overnight require 2 daily transactions each. A total of 30 fees per day for the portfolio consisting 
of 15 stocks are needed. Daily fee would be 1.52 % for the intraday and overnight portfolios. The 
fees would exceed the return of overnight and intraday. Implementing an overnight and intraday 
strategy would therefore not be a good investment from a private investor point of view.  
 
Our returns are calculated using the open, which is the first traded price of the day, and the close 
price, which is the last traded price of the day. For an investor to replicate our results would be 
challenging. There are large changes in the stock prices from second to second and the 
probability of buying or selling at the right moment is therefore, slim. This could prove to be 
even more difficult if the investor has an intraday or overnight portfolio, requiring the investor to 
trade on open and close simultaneous for all 15 stocks. This could prove to be impossible, and 
would require the investor to put limit orders before close, engage brokers or use an automated 
transaction program. If the investor choses to put a limit order, he must know the end price, and 
there is a risk that his order does not get filled. If the investor fails to buy and sell at close and 
open price, this could lead to different returns. If the investor is better off or worse off and if he 
buys 1, 2 or 3 minutes before close, it becomes impossible to convey, based on the data at hand.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
This thesis investigates the return of overnight and intraday in 15 stocks on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange over the period of 2003 to 2014. After studying the night and day return of the stocks 
in an equally weighted portfolio it is evident that the non-trading hours has had the important role 
on the overall performance of our sample. We find high overnight returns and low intraday 
returns. This is found to be persistent over the 12-year period, as this holds for yearly, monthly 
and weekday measures, as well as for sub-periods. We do not find the difference between night 
and day being caused by a higher ratio of days ending with a negative return. For the whole 
period, the ratio is centralized around 40 % negative overnight days and 50 % negative intraday 
days. The difference is thus found to be in the daily amount of overnight and intraday return.  
 
Inspecting the stocks individually reveals majority to hold positive overnight return and negative 
intraday return. More specifically, 11 out of 15 stocks have positive overnight return and 4 stocks 
positive intraday return. Interestingly, the amount of overnight and intraday return always seems 
to be the opposite. We find the stocks with positive overnight to have negative intraday returns 
and the stocks with positive intraday to have negative overnight return. Among the stocks ORK 
and SUBC have remarkable returns. These are treated as our samples’ extreme points. ORK 
delivers a high amount of intraday return and SUBC a high amount of overnight return. We 
believe the reason for SUBCs abnormal return to be the same as for the rest of the sample. While 
ORK has a return pattern unlike the majority and therefore, the return is thought to be firm 
specific.    
 
We divide the overall period into sub periods of 2003 to 2008 and 2009 to 2014. From the first to 
the second period, we see a high increase in the amount of positive overnight and negative 
intraday return. Interestingly, the increased amount is not a result of increased fluctations in 
return as the standard devation of the overnigth decreases and for the intraday it is constant.  
Neither of those is the cause for a ratio change in the amount of trading days ending with a 
negative return. We suggest the difference we observe between the overnight and intraday in the 
sub-periods being caused by three different reasons: a change in the risk-reward; illiquidity 
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premium for holding stocks over non-trading periods; the presence of a high amount of 
semiprofesional daytraders in the market. 
 
By performing a correlation and a regression, we investigated the relationship of the overnight 
and the intraday return. The correlation revealed the night and subsequent day return for majority 
of our stocks to have a negative relationship. More specifically, a tendency where the returns 
move in opposite directions was found. We further investigated if this tendency would be 
persistent with the overnight and the previous day return of night and day. The results were 
highly mixed and gave no consistent picture. The regression investigated the ability of overnight 
and preceding returns to predict the intraday return. We only found negative coefficients of 
overnight to deliver useable predictions. Even so, we found the overnight and intraday to have a 
negative relation. This partly explains the difference between night and day we observe over the 
12-year period.  
 
Our results are found to add new views to the documented anomalies of the Day of the Week 
Effect, Weekend Effect and Holliday Effect which as far as we know has only been analyzed 
using close-to-close returns. When decomposing the close-to-close return into overnight and 
intraday returns, we find the Day of the Weekend Effect, stating the returns of the weekdays to 
increase as the week progress, solely being caused by the overnight. The Weekend Effect, stating 
that there are no positive returns over the weekend, is found to be partly consistent. The true 
return of the weekend, the overnight return on Monday, is positive while an exceeding amount of 
the Monday intraday return is the one contributing to the overall negative weekend return. We 
argue the highly positive weekend return being corrected by the following Monday intraday 
return, originally explaining why we find a negative weekend return in the close-to-close. When 
investigating monthly returns, we only observe May and December cases where the intraday 
exceeds the overnight return. Both are suggested to be partly due to a reversed Holiday Effect, 
documenting strong returns close to holidays, where the overnight performs worse as a 
compensation for the strong intraday return.  
 
For future additions to the study of overnight and intraday it could be interesting to study the 
possibility of a long-overnight-short-intraday strategy (e.g. Qiu & Cai, 2013) on OSE. By taking 
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the difference we observe between the overnight and intraday return and investigate if it is 
possible to conduct a trading strategy on the negative relationship. Where one use the negative 
relation to decide whether to sit long or short.  
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